Buddhism is often seen in a paradoxical light, on one hand it is often postulated that it is an atheistic religion, which has based on the teachings of the Buddha in the Pali Canon. But on the other hand these same sources include within its framework an idea of many deities occupying varying realms within samsara. In the west for people who have wanted to shed its Christian theistic heritage but have had a sense of dissatisfaction with the materialistic based ideologies that have replaced Christian theism they have avidly welcomed the idea that one can satisfies ones spiritual self without having to accept the doctrines that they have rendered into the dustbin. Buddhism has fit this bill. Whilst it is largely accepted that Buddhism is indeed an atheistic religion put most forcibly by Von Glasenop in his book ‘Buddhism – a non theistic religion’ there have been others who have argued otherwise, and noted within Buddhism doctrines such as the Unbegotten Nirvana parallels between certain strands of theistic thought. It is therefore the task of this essay to assess the merits of these claims and once this has been commenced will be able to assess whether Buddhism is indeed a religion without a God. In the process of this discussion it will be necessary to give a definition of basic monotheism, the differences of Buddhism with theism, Buddhist parallels with theistic doctrines, and then there will commence a discussion of the merits of theism and Buddhism in which the question will be answered. Before entering into this discussion it should be noted that in Buddhism and in monotheistic traditions there are widely varying conceptions of the understanding of their philosophical traditions and therefore the reader should not be mislead into thinking that any representations offered here of such traditions are in any way definitive. I have chosen to focus on comparing and contrasting Buddhism with monotheistic teachings since the question seems to indicate that it is monotheist ideas of God we are discussing when it asks ‘is Buddhism a religion without God’. There will be mentioned, in the course of this discussion, upanishadic teachings which are set within the context of polytheistic Hinduism, however, it is well known that these teachings are in fact henotheist, i.e. that the highest truth is that there is but One God.

In the three main monotheistic traditions there is an idea of creation of the universerse by a single Higher Power. This Deity and Its workings is known primarily through the vehicle of revelation to seekers known as Prophets, and the words of these prophets are recorded in scripture which is considered to be the basis for the adherent of the religion to understand the Deity. Common attributes such as omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience are attributed to this Deity in all the monotheistic traditions. Emphised especially in the monotheistic traditions is the idea of a single, supreme deity for example the Quran states in Surah Ikhlas “Say He: Allah is One, and Only” 1. This Deity has a purpose for the universe and in particular humanity who are receptive and can vaguely perceive this Deity, or at the very least can learn of this Deity through the process of hearing revelation. It is taught in the monotheistic traditions that there is a life after death and whilst they differ slightly on the details, all are agreed that adherence to the Will of this Creator or lack of adherence to the Will of the Creator will determine the nature of whether ones afterlife will be pleasurable and painful. There is no idea of reincarnation unlike the eastern religions and once one has departed from this life they will abide eternally in the realm that will be a reward or punishment for their good acts and faith, or their wrongdoing and lack of faith. Once merits are determined on whether one has faith in the Deity and if one follows faithfully the moral code that is the revealed Will of the Deity in their holy scriptures. Except perhaps in Christianity where there is an idea of the Deity personified and thus the nature of the Deity can be seen in human term, monotheistic traditions tend to emphise an ineffable nature of the Deity that the Deity is beyond the grasping of any human conceptualisations. However equally also, there are strands within the monotheistic traditions such as the mystical strands that teach that the Deity can be experienced in this life, and ultimately the believer can unite with the Deity. The universe in monotheistic traditions is dependant on the deity sustaining it, the Deity is the first cause however, the Deity itself is not caused, and it is unbegotten.

The best way to proceed into a discussion of the differences between what the Buddha taught and theistic ideas is to look at the contrast between Buddha’s teachings and Upanishadic teachings. This is because the teachings that became collected in the Upanishads reflects the theistic tendencies that was circulating in the context of the evolving Buddhist doctrines and that the upanishadic teachings would be the closest to understanding the position of theism that the Buddha was aware of and critiqued. Buddhist teaching on the soul contrasts rather differently with the theistic upanishadic school of thought in Hinduism. They taught that each person had a permanent soul that existed from birth to rebirth, and that this self, the atman, was infact a reflection of the Brahman, the universal soul, i.e. God. However, in contrast to this teaching of a permanent soul, the Buddha taught that there was no atman, what exists is but an illusion, a non-self, anatman. Individuals, according to this teaching, are merely a collection of dharmas, which create the illusion of an individual. These dharmas work together and fluctuate and change and this is the process that leads to rebirth, but there is no permanent self which transfers from one birth to another. The upanishadic teaching was that one could gain liberation from the cycle of birth and rebirth by discovering ones true nature that the Brahman and atman are one through meditative practices. The Buddha however taught that whilst there is the deity the Brahman, It too occupies samsara and is subject to impermanence. Brahman is therefore subject to the laws of creation and is not therefore a creator, who stands above the laws of creation without limits. According to the Buddha, as reported through the Pali Canon, samsara is eternal, and whilst it operates on laws of causality it does not have a First Cause like monotheists would argue was God. If faced with the idea that the universe is subject to causality, and that this sprung from a first cause a typical Buddhist response would take this logic further by posing the question, ‘what caused the Creator?’ Another factor a Buddhist would raise, is that given so many people argued that different deities were the supreme Creator (which happens in Hinduism) to Buddhist philosophers proved that all they were offering was idle speculations since no agreed truth had been arrived at 2. It seems from this, that Buddhism does not agree with monotheistic ideas. However, an analysis of the Buddhist doctrine of nirvana seems to raise ideas that parallel monotheistic teachings of certain attributes of a supreme Deity. It is now appropriate to relay these parallels for this discussion.

Nirvana is not merely a psychological state it is in fact an independent realm 3. It is something that is reached by a practioner by attaining arhatness, or buddahood not something that is produced by the path 4. Nirvana is without source, i.e. it isuncaused, it is permanent. It is incomparable to all things in material existence, thus it is not material. Existing in the ultimate sense it is non-existent 5. This bears similarity to the kabbalistic concept of the first sefriot keter, which is known as ayin nothingness, since it has more than any being in the world and thus cannot have individuality or thingness 6 since being a thing would delineate limits on its nature to distinguish it from other things, thus it is Nothing. As the Nahj al-Balaghah, an important Shia Islamic text states:

“It cannot be said that He came into being after He had not been in existence because in that case the attributes of the created things would be assigned to Him and there would remain no difference between them and Him, and He would have no distinction over them. 7”

The Buddha has been attributed with the power of omniensce, though he does not exercise it all the time, it is a power he has access to. This must be inextricably linked with his reaching nirvana, and, it could therefore be postulated, that this attribute is linked to Nirvana, which has parallels with monotheistic teachings of an omnienscent deity.

In Theravada Buddhism, it appears that nirvana is an independent realm entirely separate from samsara, a dualistic sense of the nature of things. However, there must be some link between these realms otherwise there would be no way for someone in samsara to gain release into nirvana. It appears that the Mahayana’s view of nirvana and samsara is more explicitly true to this logic. They teach that “reality is non dual 8” and that nirvana is a state of supreme Mind which “includes in itself all states of being of the phenomenal world and the transcendental world” 9. Thus it can be said that samsara and nirvana are One and that it comes down to ones perception of existence as to what realm one believes oneself to be in. In samsara ones mind is impure and can see only multiplicity but by looking beyond multiplicity in nature, one can perceive the essence of the ultimate truth, which is ineffable, and beyond the attributes of the things we perceive with our ordinary eyes 10. This is similar to the highest truth of Allah being beyond the attributes of this world, and thus having no attributes. In Islam there is the famous 99 attributes of Allah, which are qualities that one uses as analogies to God, not as things in and of themselves but as starting points to be transcended. The highest truth of Allah is God beyond attribution. “There is nothing like unto Him” – Surah al Ikhlas. This idea of Ultimate Truth being One parallels mystical strands of the monotheistic religions.

Buddhists describe Nirvana as a realm, which is permanent. It is unbegotton. This idea of eternalness and unbegotteness and not subject to causality parallels monotheistic teaching of the nature of God who is eternal, Uncaused, Unbegotten, the Quran states this idea succinctly when it states in Surah Ikhlas “He begets not nor is He begotten” It seems clear that certainly in the aspects of the impersonal non anthropomorphic aspects of monotheism there are striking parallels with Buddhist teaching on Nirvana.

Now we proceed to a brief discussion of the contrasting merits. On one hand we have the stern rejection of the idea of a supreme creator. Samsara is eternal, the logic of causality means that there can be no first cause, if a first cause is postulated it begs the question what caused that cause. So on that alone the idea of a creation and its Creator, that is such an integral part of monotheism is rejected. However, the previous paragraph has shown parallels between other aspects of Buddhist teachings of nirvana and certain aspects of various strands of monotheism. Examples of these are the idea of nirvana being permanent, unbegotten, beyond human conceptual grasping, etc, which parallel monotheistic teachings of a supreme Deity. Also, the Mahayana idea of samsara and nirvana being One Realty, but samsara being a false perception of that reality is very similar to mystical strands of monotheist teachings of all is contained in One God. If nirvana and samsara are in reality One then it could be said that nirvana is omnipresent which is another defining feature of a monotheist supreme Deity. Whilst it seems that the Theravada school with the oldest Buddhist scriptures the pali canon seems to assert that reality is dual the Mahayana have developed the logic of Buddhist doctrines so it is thus justified to state that this is the intended teaching of the Buddha, since Mahayana teachings are a development of the logic that the Buddha laid down. The fact that the Buddha has access to omniensence seems to be linked to his attaining Nirvana is somewhat similar to a seerer gaining prophetic insight by union with the Divine. Thus, it seems that Nirvana and the Divine both possess the attribute of omniscience.

In conclusion, it seems reasonable to sum up by saying that the only differing point between Buddhism and monotheism is on the attribute of Creation, which seems to be denied. However despite this there are many teachings that parallel the idea of Deity in the monotheistic religions when it comes to the subject of the supreme state and realm, nirvana. So, despite appearances of otherwise due to the teaching on creatorship, it actually seems justified in stating that Buddhism is not a religion without a God, it does in fact have a God but that this God is called Nirvana. However, this conception of God is not exactly the same as the monotheist religions, which has a doctrine of the creative aspect of God. But, if one looks deeper and follows the logic that God ultimately transcends all conceptualisations derived from this world of multiplicity, and that God is eternal, and one parallels this with the teaching that samsara and Nirvana are One, and that Nirvana is eternal, this may be a way of even reconciling that difference with the creation aspect of the deity. Since the creator aspect of the deity only has relevance when looked at from a samsaric vantage point, from an enlightened point of view there is nothing but the Deity.

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[1] Multiligual Quran, Surah 112, http://al-islam.org/quran/
[2] Von Glasenapp H, Buddhism – A Non Thiestic Religion, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970. p 37
[3] Ward, Keith, Images of eternity : concepts of God in five religious traditions, Oxford, Oneworld, 1993. p 60
[4] Ibid p61
[5] Ibid p61
[6] Chanan Matt, Zohar The Book Of Enlightenment, Paulist Press 1983 p34
[7] Nahj al- Balagha, sermon 186, http://www.al-islam.org/nahj/186.htm
[8] Ward, Keith, Images of eternity : concepts of God in five religious traditions, Oxford, Oneworld, 1993. p64
[9] Ibid p64
[10] Ibid p65

Bibliography

Multiligual Quran, http://al-islam.org/quran/

Von Glasenapp H, Buddhism – A Non Thiestic Religion, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970

Ward, Keith, Images of eternity : concepts of God in five religious traditions, Oxford, Oneworld, 1993.

Chanan Matt, Zohar The Book Of Enlightenment, Paulist Press 1983

Nahj al- Balagha, http://www.al-islam.org/nahj

 Ok a bit crappy now, but i think it still raises some valid points as to the religious tendency of many marxists.

This considers the question as to whether Marxism can be defined as a religion and I will argue in the course of this that this is the case. I will begin this by demonstrating that Marxism and its believers (Marxists) along with substantive and functional definitions of religion can be fitted into Ninian Smart’s seven dimensional model (S.D.M). I will then go on to acknowledge the counter-argument to that claim, by acknowledging the limitations of the S.D.M. It will then become necessary to go on to show the parallels between Marxism and Judeo-Christianity to the point where Marxism can be viewed as an offshoot from these doctrines and this, it is hoped, will prove that there is in fact a substantial basis to my claim.

Before continuing on however it should be noted that when I argue that Marxism is a religion I am not merely referring to the writings of Marx, I include in this discussion Marxists also, this is because it is more meaningful to talk of a religion being an interaction between its doctrine and its believers, e.g. the tendency of believers to form institutions around a teaching, to split into sects regarding different interpretations of the doctrine, and the sense of identity and purpose adherents of religion have. This of course raises problems since one could come with the claim that since we are discussing Marxists as well as Marxism then it is meaningless to talk of Marxism being a religion since we are dealing with Marxists rather than the writings of Marx. However, it could be countered that it is a part of Marx’s writings that those who are conscious of History’s development should form a communist party i.e. a group of people (an institution) as a means of educating the emerging proletariat of their historic role1. This therefore creates the very kind of vehicle which gives rise to the interaction between believers and doctrine that constitutes a religious character. This interaction is therefore intended by the doctrine of Marxism which thus gives the writer legitimacy in analysing the features of Marxists to gain an insight into the religious character of Marxism. Sometimes I will use the word Marxism when referring to something concerning its believers – this is merely for the sake of convenience.

It is ‘common knowledge’ that Marxists have a hostile opinion towards religion, but it has also been suggested that Marxism shares many features with religions, particularly of the Judea-Christian variety. Marxists would deny this saying that this is nonsense and it is easy to distinguish Marxism, a scientific discipline from the ‘superstitious baloney’ that is religion. However, when one actually attempts to define what a religion is, given the complexity of varying beliefs and practices within different religions, it soon becomes clear that it is difficult to draw a line between Marxism and religion. To see if the claim that Marxism can be defined along religious lines is justified, I will now discuss how religion can be defined by scholars to see if Marxism stands apart from religious doctrine, or if it is a religious doctrine.

Two main approaches to define religions by scholars have been proposed: substantive and functional. Substantive definitions pick out doctrinal and practitional characteristics of religions. An example of a substantive definition is ‘all religions have a supreme deity.’ Unfortunately substantive definitions can run into problems given the wide-ranging doctrinal differences between traditions. For example a common definition of religion would perhaps mention that religions have a supreme God i.e. YHVH in Judaism, Brahma in Hinduism, and Allah in Islam. However this definition would automatically exclude many Buddhists who do not believe in a Supreme Deity. Perhaps one could put forth a substantive definition that religions believe in some kind of afterlife, whereas Marxism does not, as a means of defining religion apart from Marxism but again many Taoists do not subscribe to a belief in the afterlife. So, if one defines Taoism as a religion (which some do – others define it as a philosophy) then the question of Marxism being a religion continues to be open. Functional definitions look to what religions do for its adherents. For example, a functional definition may say that religion gives someone a sense of belonging to a particular group which has a great collective purpose and thus gives the individual meaning and purpose for his/her life. However, whilst someone may feel part of a great movement in the course of humanity’s history towards a great end, by being a member of the Catholic Church, they will also get that same feeling being a communist party member or perhaps even an avid football supporter. This is famously the problem of functional definitions they can be inclusive of almost anything.

A famous way of attempting to avoid the pitfalls of substantive and functional approaches to defining religion is Ninian Smart’s seven dimensional model. It looks to a combination of seven substantive and functional definitions called dimensions, and if a tradition meets the criterion of most of these dimensions they could be said to be a religion. The seven dimensions are:

The practical and ritual dimension – for example the catholic mass.

The experiential and emotionaldimension – e.g. mystical experience, awe etc

The narrative or mythic dimension – e.g. The Jewish history (both historical and allegorical interwoven in the Torah)

The doctrinal and philosophical dimension – e.g. doctrine of vicarious atonement, the trinity, etc.

The ethical and legal dimension – e.g. Shariah, the five Buddhist precepts, etc.

The social and institutional dimension – e.g. church, ummah, sangha, etc.

The material dimension – churches, idols, the Ganges, etc.

Smart reminds us that not every single dimension needs to be accounted for in a tradition to grant it religion status – just most. “Naturally there are religious movements or manifestations where one or other of the dimensions are so weak as to be virtually absent…. Buddhist modernists, concentrating on meditation, ethics, and philosophy, pay scant regard to the narrative dimension of Buddhism” 2

Marxism conforms to most of the dimensions within this model of definition. It has its doctrinal dimension i.e. one has to believe in the basic ‘scientific’ principle of dialectical materialism. It has a ritualistic dimension i.e. May Day, speeches at ‘religious festivals’ called protests. In the emotional dimension it holds emotions of “internationalism” and “revolutionary commitment” (Smart). Within the ethical dimension there is the notion of solidarity with the oppressed. The institutional dimension could be identified as the ‘party’. The artistic dimension encompasses “heroic music” (Smart) and statues and massive paintings of Communist leaders. A course of history dependent on dialectical laws ( a sacred history akin to the sacred history represented in the Torah), could be seen as part of the mythic dimension.

It could be argued that even using the seven dimensional model, trivial things that are clearly not what we would commonly understand to be religions (such as supporting a football team) can be interpreted as being a religion. I would accept that claim. It seems clear therefore, that this model has the facility to indicate that something under scrutiny may be religious. However, the model still has to have something built on top of it to prove the thesis that Marxism is a religion. The substance of my case has to rest, therefore, on the thesis that Marxism bears similarity to the abrahamic traditions. It indeed rests on the assumption that Marxism has inherited a lot of its teaching from the preceding Judeo-Christian teachings.

Marxism advances an idea that History is destined to go towards an order wherein injustice, inequality, etc will cease to be. This almost mirrors entirely Christian, Islamic and Judaic teachings of the messianic era, wherein this world of evil, sin, injustice and exploitation will end with the coming of the Messiah, or the second coming of Christ, or the Rise of Imam Mahdi. The above mentioned Marxist view of history, to a Marxist, will have the same comforting effect as the equivalent messianic teaching would to believers in the above religious traditions. One can counter this claim by saying that this is merely a coincidence that a scientific and secular subject parallels abrahamic teaching. However, if one looks at all the prevailing secular philosophies nowadays, one will not see the same confidence in the direction of history – it is only in religions (especially the abrahamic ones) where you see this occurring.

Marxism also bears similarity to the Judeo-Christian traditions in the sense that it proscribes practice to go with its philosophy. The programme offered in the communist manifesto as a means of uplifting society to a genuinely egalitarian communist one, has been justifiably compared to the beatitudes of Christ by George Patterson in the book Christianity and Marxism3. Its teaching that the bourgeois communist intellectuals of the Party should serve the masses parallels Christ’s exhortation to his disciples, and by extension the church, to serve the needs of the community.

The way that different creeds and sects have arisen since Marx’s texts were penned e.g. Marxist – Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism, Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Militant Labour, etc. shows that just as it can be observed that people have come up with different interpretations of a doctrine, within religions, for the different needs for their community, so the same can be argued for Marxism.

Another tendency where Marxism bears similarity to Christianity is the need its adherents have for proselytising its doctrine. For example, the Stop the War coalition which organised the marches against the Iraq war was a coalition between the SWP and the Muslim Association of Britain. During these protests, there were stalls with books critiquing ‘Islamism’ from a Marxist standpoint by Chris Harman (an SWP intellectual). Clearly Marxists of the SWP sect saw the Iraq war and the resultant growing political consciousness amongst British Muslims as an opportunity to convert/recruit Muslims to their cause. This underhand form of proselytising bears similarities to a lot of Christian sects.

To conclude, it is hard to distinguish Marxism from other religions by using either substantive or functional definitions, or Ninian Smarts SDM. However, other intuitively non-religious phenomena, such as supporting a football team, can be included in these definitions. Therefore, I have argued that Marxism can be defined as a religion using examples where it forms parallels with religions particularly of the abrahamic traditions. If this is convincing, then the implications could be that Karl Marx was somebody who couldn’t see in the present institutional religions something that could bring about the promise of justice that they argued for, and he, therefore, acted characteristically like a religious believer struggling with his faith, bringing forth a radical reinterpretation of the Judeo-Christian religions that could rationalise their teachings for the circumstances he perceived. This thesis, of course, would require more research.
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[1] Eddy, WCH, Understanding Marxism, pp14
[2] Smart: Old Traditions and Modern Transformations – cited from an Open University A103 textbook that was thrown out and thus I cannot get the exact page number.
[3] Scarfe & Sookhdeo. Christianity and Marxism pp24

By: Chris Carlson – Venezuelanalysis.com

Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez called on Pope Benedict XVI to apologize to the indigenous people of Latin America for his comments on the evangelization of the region. During an official visit to Brazil last week, the Pope defended the evangelization of the indigenous people of Latin America, claiming that Christianity had not been “imposed” upon them. Chavez disputed this in a speech Friday night, calling on his nation to challenge the old capitalist hegemony and create a new society.

In a nationally broadcast speech at an event in Caracas, Chavez criticized the Pope’s remarks and asked him to “offer an apology to the people of our America.”

“How can the Pope say that the evangelization was not imposed,” said Chavez. “Then why did our indigenous people have to flee to the jungles and the mountains?” he asked.

Pope Benedict XVI made the remarks last week during his first visit to Latin America. While in Sao Paulo, Brazil, the Pope claimed that Christianity was not “imposed by a foreign culture” on the pre-Columbian cultures, but rather that these populations where “silently yearning” to be converted to Christianity. The pope went on to criticize the resurgence of pre-Columbian religions in the region, calling them “a regression.”

President Chavez called these statements into question, accusing the Pope of ignoring what he called the holocaust of the colonial era, in which millions of people were killed by war, disease and slavery, with the support of the Catholic Church.

“What happened here was much worse than the holocaust in the Second World War, and no one can deny us that reality,” said Chavez. “Not even his Holiness can come here to our land and deny the holocaust of the indigenous people.”

Chavez referred to the work of the Spanish Dominican priest Bartolome de Las Casas, who denounced the genocide of the indigenous people in the 16th Century.

“Christ came to America much later. He didn’t arrive with Columbus, the anti-Christ came with Columbus,” stated Chavez, who went on to ask the Pope to apologize for his error.

“Just like the Catholic Church has recognized errors, as a descendant of those martyr Indians that died by the millions, I ask, with all respect, your Holiness, apologize, because here there was a real genocide,” Chavez pleaded.

Giving birth to the new, burying the old

Chavez went on to emphasize in his speech on Friday the need to replace the old sociopolitical structures that oppose the construction of a new society. Chavez spoke of the double task of the revolution to give birth to a new counter-hegemony, as well as the necessity of burying the old.

“Those of us who push for the birth of the new, we have a doubly historic task: we are the creators of the new, but also we must be those who bury the old,” said Chavez.

Paraphrasing the renowned Italian political theorist Antonio Gramsci, Chavez spoke of the imperial hegemony imposed on South American nations, and the need to challenge this hegemony.

“Real historic crises happen when there is something that is going to die, but has not quite died, and at the same time there is something new being born, but it hasn’t quite been born yet,” he said.

Chavez referred to the policies of the United States and the use of the School of the Americas to train Latin American armies to torture and kill their own people, using as an example the Caracazo massacre in Venezuela in 1989.

“They turned us against our own people, to massacre them, many times, they used us. The Caracazo was the ultimate tragedy of that history,” he said.

Chavez also responded to recent accusations of “politicizing” the military due to the use of the new slogan “socialism, homeland, or death,” among military ranks.

“Socialism is a concept that goes much further than a political party, it is a national concept, it is a national project,” he said

Well studies over, got some resits to study for, need a distraction, this should do…

Maybe something productive will develop out of this..

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